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IN THE SUPRF1~'1E COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 












RAYMOND G. MUNFORD, CASE NO. 18088 
Defendant and ) 
Respondent • ) 
______________________________ ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEl\.1ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is Appeal from the final Order of the Honorable 
J. Duffy Palmer, Judge of the1 District Court of Morgan 
County, State of Utah, denying Appellant's Motion for Recon-
sideration or Modification of the Decree. 
DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT 
On September 3, 1981, the Appellant's Motion for Modi-
fica t ion or Reconsideration was heard and denied by the 
Court; which found that the matter was res judicata, even 
though a loan of some $23,-000.00, was made to the Respondent 
during the pendency of the divorce proceeding, and while the 
Respondent was subject to a Restraining Order as to encum-
bering of any property. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the District Court's Order, 
based on the fact that the District Court abused its dis-
cretion in denying Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, 
or in the alternative, Motion for Modification of the 
Decree, as provided for in § 30-3-5 of the Utah Code, which 
provides that the Court shal 1 have continuing jurisdiction 
to make such subsequent changes or new orders with respect 
to the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable 
and necessary. The $23,000.00 loan was never taken into 
consideration by the District Court in its findings of fact 
or conclusions of law, or subsequent Decree of Divorce; and 
therefore, the Motion for Modification should have been 
granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 14, 1981, the Appellant filed a divorce Com-
plaint in the District Court of Morgan County, State of 
Utah. In her Complaint, Appellant requested that an Order 
be issued restraining the Respondent from selling, disposing 
of, or encumbering any of the assets of the marriage. (R 5) 
Appellant's Petition included an Order requiring the 
Respondent 
cause, if 
to appear at a time and place set to there show 
any, why Respondent should not be restrained 
permanently. A temporary Order was signed by the Honorable 
2 
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John F. Wahlquist, Judge of the District Court, on 
January 14, 1981, restraining the Respondent from any way 
disposing, selling, or encumbering any of the assets of this 
marriage. (R 8) 
A hearing was held on the matter on February 5, 1981, 
at which time the Restraining Order was made permanent by 
the Court, and Respondent was restrained from disposing, 
selling or encumbering any of the assets of the mar-
r i age . ( R 2 3) 
At the same time, and without any knowledge on the part 
of the Appellant, on December 15, 1980, Respondent made 
application for a $23,000.00 loan with the Ogden Railway 
Employees Credit Union. The loan was processed in the 
intervening period, and subsequently approved on January 15, 
1981, at which time the Credit Union issued a check for the 
sum of $16,800.00 to the Respondent. The money was 
subsequently disposed of by the Respondent, and there has 
been no satisfactory accounting for said money. The first 
time Appe 11 ant was made aware of such loan, was at the 
trial of her divorce proceeding, which was heard on May 12, 
1981. The Court at that time, failed to take into 
consideration any of the proceeds of the loan, which 
Respondent had received. 
(R 34, 35) 
Subsequently, Appellant, on June 30, 1981, made a 
r.lotion for Modification· of the Divorce Decree and Property 
Settlement, based on the fact that she was previously 
3 
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unaware of the loan for $23,000.00 and of the second 
mortgage securing it on the house previously owned by the 
Appellant and Respondent, jointly as husband and wife. 
(R 37) 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as found by 
the Court, was not finalized until July 17, 1981, and was 
signed by the Court at that time, so that Appellant's Motion 
for Reconsideration or Modification of the Decree was timely 
made. (R 42) 
On September 3, 1981, the Motion was heard, and was 
denied by the Court, wh9se reason was that the issue was res 
judicata, even though the $23 ,000 .00 was apparently never 
taken into consideration in the Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law, and the subsequent Decree issued by the 
Court in the Property Settlement. (R 53) 
ARGUl\.1ENT 
POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION 
OR RECONSIDERATION. 
The loan of $23,000.00 was never taken into considera-
tion, either at. trial or in the subsequent Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, or Decree, as issued by the Court. 
Section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code specifically provides 
that when a Decree of Divorce is made, the Court may make 
such orders in relation to property as may be equitable. 
4 
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The section further provides that the Court shall have con-
tinuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or new 
orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the 
parties, or the distribution of the property as shall be 
reasonable and necessary. In the case of Wooley v~ Wooley, 
113 Utah 391, 195 P.2d, 743, the Court held that a property 
division award granting· a husband who obtained the divorce 
an amount approximating a one-third standard in making a 
cash settlement to his wife in lieu of alimony was unfair 
and unjust in denying the wife her share of any increase in 
value of speculative mining investments by the husband from 
funds jointly accumulated, so that the decree was modified 
on appeal, providing that sums awarded should not be paid in 
lieu of alimony and by directing the trial court to retain 
jurisdiction to make a further award in the event the 
husband realized his mining investment. Likewise, the Court 
in this instance, should have made some provision regarding 
the $23,000.00 loan, which was the result of a second 
mortgage on the house, in which both parties had an 
interest. The Court abused its discretion in denying 
Appellant's Motion for Modification or Reconsideration. 
In order that the Court may make an equitable distri-
bution of the property owned by the parties, both parties 
must fully disclose to the Court what their condition was as 
to the property. Sm i t h v • Sm i t h , 7 7 U t ah 6 0 2 9 1 P . 2 9 8 . 
Further, where a husband, in a divorce action, fraudulently 
5 
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induces his wife to rely upon a private agreement as to the 
parties' property which the husband had no intention of 
keeping, and not to seek a distribution of the property in 
the Divorce Decree, the fraud was extrinsic and constituted 
a valid ground for the subsequent modification of the 
divorce decree as to the property rights of the parties. 
Glover v. Glover, 121 Utah 362, 242 P.2d 298. 
Here the Respondent fraudulently concealed the fact of 
the loan having been made without the consent and knowledge 
of the Appellant, and did not reveal the loan until the 
proceeds from same were entirely expended, and while, under 
a Restraining Order preventing him from doing the same. 
Such activity on his part was a fraud on the Court, and was 
grounds for subsequent proceeding to modify Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of.Law of the Court. 
Equity in a home purchased by the husband, subsequent 
to wife's filing for divorce and prior to termination of 
marriage by the Divorce Decree was a marital asset, subject 
to division; the marital estate is evaluated according to 
the existing property interest at the time the marriage is 
terminated by the Decree of tlivorce of the Court. Fletcher 
v. F!_e!_cher, (1980) 615 P.2d 1218. Therefore, the Appel-
lant's equity in the home, which they jointly purchased was 
an asset of the marriage, which was subject to division by 
the Court, and the Court's refusal to take it into consider-
ation during- the divorce proceeding or subsequent ~.lotion for 
6 
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Modification clearly constituted an abuse of discretion, 
since the marital estate is to be evaluated according to the 
existing property interest at the time the marriage is ter-
minated by the Decree of the Court. 
Property settlements·, although entitled to a greater 
sanctity than alimony and support payments, in proceedings 
to modify divorce decrees are not sacrosanct and are not 
beyond the power of the Court of equity to modify. Chandler 
v . W~_! , 6 10 P • 2 d 1 2 9 9 ( 19 8 0) . 
In LeBre.!_on v. LeBre_!on, 604 P.2d 469, (1979), the 
Court held that in view of the 1969 divorce decrees 
ambiguity as to whether the equity of the marital home 
should be divided according to its present value or value at 
the t irne of the divorce, a remand of the case would be 
ordered for an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of 
determining what is reasonable and necessary pursuant to the 
statute. Likewise, the appropriate proceeding in this case 
would be a remand for an evidentiary hearing, in order that 
the proceeds of the loan, which placed an additional 1 ien 
upon the marital home can be equitably divided between the 
parties, which was not done in the original proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted to this Honorable Court 
that the District Court wrongfully denied the Appellant's 
Motion for Modification and abused its discretion in so 
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doing, in view of the fact that the loan which Respondent 
took out on the marital home, and which he received the 
proceeds from, subsequent to a Restraining Order, was never 
taken into consideration by the District Court, and the 
proceeds thereof were never divided. The District Court's 
finding that the matter was res judicata is contrary to the 
facts of this case, and does not demonstrate an appreciation 
of or consideration of the matter in controversy. 
Wherefore, the Appellant respectfully submits that this 
case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing, so that 
the District Court may make an equitable distribution of the 
money obtained by the Respondent. 
1981. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3_0 day of November, 
VLAHOS, PERKINS & SHARP 
_,,:..,.,,.,~.:. 
t::~~,,~~1' ;;;'fr;;p ;~,;~r;%t~, 
BY 
PETE-N~-VLAHOS~~of=the-Firrn--~-
Attorneys for Appellant 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3__C2_ day of November, 
1981, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing Brief of Appellant, by placing same in the United 
States Mail, postage prepaid and addressed to the following: 
GAY LEN S • YOUNG, JR. 
2188 Highland Drive, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(Attorney for Respondent) 
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